

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANGELA DENISE NAILS, )  
                          )  
PLAINTIFF,            )  
                          )  
v.                     ) CASE NO.: 1:06-cv-798-MEF  
                          )  
EUGENE PRESTON, *et al.*,        ) (WO-Not Recommended for Publication)  
                          )  
DEFENDANTS.            )

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

Plaintiff has filed a motion seeking to proceed *in forma pauperis* in this action (Doc. # 2). Upon consideration of the motion, it is

ORDERED that the motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* is GRANTED. Upon review of the complaint filed in this case, the court concludes that dismissal of the complaint prior to service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).<sup>1</sup>

On September 6, 2006, Angela Denise Nails (“Nails”) filed her second lawsuit in this Court against Eugene and Pauline Preston (“the Prestons”) for injuries Nails allegedly suffered when Eugene Preston struck Nails with a vehicle owned by Pauline Preston.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The statute provides, in pertinent part: “[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal— (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

<sup>2</sup> Nails filed her first lawsuit against the Prestons on March 17, 2006. *See Nails v. Preston et al.*, 1:06cv246 (M.D. Ala. 2006). Like the instant lawsuit, Nails’ first suit also arose out of alleged injuries to Nails when she was struck by a vehicle driven by Eugene Preston and owned by Pauline Preston. On April 7, 2006, the Court dismissed Nails’ first lawsuit without prejudice because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Nails made two unsuccessful attempts to have this Court reconsider this ruling and then simply

A federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction. *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). That is, a federal court is authorized to entertain only certain actions which the Constitution or Congress has authorized it to hear. *Id.* “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, ..., and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction,...” *Id.* (citations omitted). Therefore, a plaintiff is required by Rule 8(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allege in his complaint “a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends.” Indeed, a federal court’s jurisdiction must be established by a plaintiff in the complaint by stating the basis of the court’s jurisdiction and by pleading facts that demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction. *Taylor v. Appleton*, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994); *Kirkland Masonry, Inc. v. Comm'r*, 614 F.2d 532, 533 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980) (same).<sup>3</sup>

*Pro se* litigants are not excused from compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the court is required to liberally construe a *pro se* litigant’s pleadings, the court does not have “license to serve as *de facto* counsel for a party ..., or to re-write an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action....” *GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla.*, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998). Consequently, a court may not excuse a *pro se* litigant from the requirement of stating the basis for the court’s jurisdiction in her pleadings. “[O]nce a court determines that there has been no [Congressional] grant

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filed a new lawsuit with substantially similar allegations.

<sup>3</sup> In *Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala.*, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. Nov. 3, 1981) (*en banc*), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

that covers a particular case, the court's sole remaining act is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction." *Morrison v. Allstate Indemnity Co.*, 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000). *Accord, Barnett v. Bailey*, 956 F.2d 1036, 1039-41 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992) (holding that a court is required to examine its jurisdiction over an action at any time and dismiss an action *sua sponte* for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if jurisdiction is not found). Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) specifically provides that "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lack jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (emphasis added).

After a careful review of the Complaint (Doc. # 1), the Court finds that Nails has failed to articulate any conceivable basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, given that this action is a personal injury action between private parties who all are citizens of Alabama,<sup>4</sup> the Court cannot imagine any possible, but as yet unarticulated basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Neither the United States Constitution, nor any act of Congress authorizes this Court to entertain this cause of action. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for want of subject matter jurisdiction.

DONE this the 11<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2006.

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/s/ Mark E. Fuller  
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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<sup>4</sup> Nails has consistently alleged that she and the Prestons are citizens of Alabama.

A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at [www.ca11.uscourts.gov](http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov)  
 Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from \$255.00 to \$455.00.

## CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST

1. **Appealable Orders:** Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:

- (a) **Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291:** Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1 365, 1 368 (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
- (b) **In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims,** a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885- 86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys’ fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S.196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
- (c) **Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a):** Appeals are permitted from orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . .” and from “[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.” Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
- (d) **Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5:** The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court’s denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
- (e) **Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule:** Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).

2. **Time for Filing:** The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:

- (a) **Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1):** A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. **THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD – no additional days are provided for mailing.** Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
- (b) **Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3):** “If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”
- (c) **Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4):** If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
- (d) **Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6):** Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
- (e) **Fed.R.App.P. 4(c):** If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.

3. **Format of the notice of appeal:** Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.

4. **Effect of a notice of appeal:** A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).